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Highlights: 
- This article examines the effect of democracy and intelligence on economic growth. 
- This article reports novel evidence of a new channel through which democracy has 
impact on economic growth. 
- Weak democratic regimes are harmful for economic growth in low-IQ nations. 
- This article interacts democracy and intelligence  
 
Abstract 
Empirical literature has long conjectured that institutional arrangements, proxied by democracy, 
social capital and intelligence, are relevant determinants in cross-country differences in 
economic performance. Related literature, however, predominantly documents that democracy 
has either a negative or not significant impact on economic growth, while intelligence is assumed 
to have strong and direct effect on economic performance. We propose that that the effect of 
democratization is mediated by the degree of the approval to such policies, and that intelligence 
may alleviate or diminish the negative effect of weak institutions on economic growth. We 
empirically, investigate the interactive effect of democracy and intelligence on economic growth, 
using data from 93 nations, over the period 1970-2013. The results show that the relationship 
link between democracy and the real GDP growth varies with a nation’s level of cognitive 
abilities. The results remain robust to various estimation techniques, control variables and time 
periods. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the seminal work of Barro (1991), the empirical literature on the cross-national 
determinants of economic growth has mushroomed (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2005; 
Beck, Levine & Loayza, 2000; Temple, 1999). One potential antecedent that attracted substantial 
attention from researchers is the effect of political regimes on economic growth, with a notable 
focus on democratic institutions. Despite the widely recognized relevance of democratic 
institutions for economic development (e.g. Gerring, Bond, Barndt & Moren, 2005; Piatek, 
Szarzec & Pilic, 2013), ‘the impact of democracy on economic growth is less straightforward 
and has been a matter of much more controversy among scholars’ (Jaunky, 2013 p. 990). Some 
studies document negative or not significant effect, while others argue that democracy fosters 
economic growth (Adelman & Morris, 1967; Banks, 1970, Dick, 1974; Drury, Krieckhaus & 
Lusztig, 2006).  
A separate line of empirical literature questions the direct effect of democracy 
conjecturing that democracy is endogenous in economic growth regressions and that quality of 
human skills, cognitive structures, national capacity, social capital and regime stability (“natural 
order” as suggested by Hoppe (2001)) are exogenous antecedents of economic growth (e.g. 
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes & Shleifer, 2004; Oesterdiekhoff, 2014). Abundant evidence 
reported in cross-national studies also suggests that the indirect effect of political regime on 
economic growth is captured by political stability, low levels of corruption and higher human 
capital accumulation (Helliwell, 1994; Baum & Lake, 2003)1. 
This study further contributes to the literature that investigates how democracy and 
economic growth are related, and is motivated by recently published articles in this journal that 
report statistically significant link between intelligence and institutional arrangements (e.g. 
Kanyama, 2014; Carl, 2015; Salahodjaev, 2015). This paper links the related studies in the sense 
that intelligence and political regimes are complemental in inducing the foundations for long run 
economic growth. In particular, we propose that there are two possible explanations for 
anticipating significant interactive effect between intelligence and democracy on economic 
growth, the first of which is cognitive capacity. According to Kanyama (2014) “intelligence 
captures the level of the national ability to understand the principles and rules that govern 
national institutions and to orient their structure toward market-oriented policies, with the 
                                                             
1Knutsen (2013) suggests that ‘there is still much uncertainty and debate on the economic effects of [democratic 
institutions] and whether such effects are context-dependent’. Moreover, empirical evidence seems to suggest that 
‘the resources necessary for investment cannot be accumulated by democratic means’ (Rao, 1984 - 1985 p. 74). 
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ultimate objective of benefiting the general population” (p. 45). In particular, Potrafke (2012) 
documents that corruption is lower in high-IQ societies because economic agents with higher 
cognitive abilitiesare more likely to detect and punish rent-seeking actions (Galston, 2001). In a 
similar vein, Salahodjaev (2015) tested the hypothesis that the size of shadow economy is lower 
in high-IQ nations, using cross-country data for the period 1999-2007. The study finds that 
intelligence predicts the size of informal economy even after controlling for reverse causality 
between institutional arrangements and the quality of human capital devoted to productive 
activities.  
Second, intelligence and education are closely correlated and there is plenty evidence that 
education determines the quality of democratic institutions (e.g. Lipset, 1959, 1960). According 
to Aristotle/Lipset hypothesis education as an essential antecedent of “civic culture” and 
democratic behavior. Almond & Verba (1989 p. 315) argue that “[t]he uneducated man or the 
man with limited education is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a higher 
level of education”.  
In data from the USA and the UK, Milligan et al. (2004) find positive link between extra 
schooling caused by mandatory schooling laws and the probability of becoming politically 
involved. Likewise, Glaeser, Ponzetto & Shleifer (2007), using data from 34 countries, document 
that education increases benefits of political participation and promotes society-wide support for 
democratic institutions. In line with the education-as-a-cause view, intelligence affects 
individual’s cognitive abilities, which in turn instrumental to political orientations. In addition, 
factors such as, political interest, social attitudes and voter turnout are also the basis of the 
cognitive abilities (e.g. McCourt et al., 1999; Deary, Batty & Gale, 2008b). A number of articles 
in this journal have presented evidence that intelligent individuals are more likely to vote for a 
party with a democratic agenda (Rindermann et al., 2012), and attend demonstrations and 
petitions (Deary, Batty & Gale, 2008a).  
In sum, we conjecture that democracy does not have statistically effect on economic 
growth in regressions where the interrelation between cognitive abilities of citizens and 
democratic institutions is not accounted. Rather, we anticipate the indirect impact of political 
regimes through intelligence of nations in weak democratic countries. While authoritarian 
regime might have negative effect on economic growth, there is evidence that authoritarian 
countries, with high-IQ population, in East Asia managed to escape rent-seeking and politically 
motivated policy failures (Haggard, 1990) because more intelligence of economic agents is 
associated with longer time horizons (Shamosh & Gray, 2008). 
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The anticipated link between democracy, intelligence and economic growth is explored 
on a sample 93 nations for the period 1970-2013. This paper contributes to empirical literature in 
a number of ways. First, ours is the first study that considers the interaction effect of intelligence 
and political regime on democracy-growth nexus. With the dataset by Lynn & Vanhanen (2012), 
we revisit how previous findings change when we include the national IQ scores in the growth 
models. 
Second, to maximize the sample size and to retain comparability with related literature, 
we investigate the impact of democracy on long-term and short-term economic growth. We 
utilize two sample periods: 1970–2013 and 1990–2013. 
This study documents that the association between democracy and economic 
performance in non-linear and depends on the intelligence of nations. In particular, we find that 
the interaction between IQ and democracy is negative, suggesting countries with higher level of 
cognitive abilities (higher than the threshold = 85.6 national IQ points) can neutralize the 
negative effect of non-democratic institutions on economic growth. 
 
2. Model and data 
We now turn to a discussion of the main data we use in our empirical analysis. The main 
results cover the years 1970–2013 and we include both developed and developing nations in our 
sample. Summary statistics for the data are presented in Table 1. The dependent variable in our 
article is average annual GDP growth rates (      7013 ) at market prices based on constant 
local currency from 1970 to 2013. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP in our sample 
averaged 3.81%, and this average change ranged from -5.41% (South Sudan) and 16.96% 
(Equatorial Guinea). The data is retrieved from World Development Indicators (WDI).  
Our key independent variable is democratic index (          ) calculated as an 
arithmetic mean of civil liberties and political rights indices. Political rights allow citizens to join 
political parties and organizations, compete for public office, vote freely for distinct alternative 
candidates in legitimate elections, and elect representatives who have a real impact on public 
policies and are accountable to voters. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and 
belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy, including 
economic freedom, without interference from the state2. This proxy for the quality of democratic 
institutions has been extensively used in empirical literature (see e.g. Hanke & Walters, 1997; 
Salahodjaev, 2015). Democratic index is from Freedom in the World survey. We recode the data 
                                                             
2 The complete description is available at http://www.democracyweb.org/about/fiw1.php 
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so that the most democratic nations (for example, Australia, and so on) score a seven, while the 
least democratic (for example, Mongolia, Guinea and so on) score one.  
Regarding the intelligence indicator, we rely on average national IQ scores. This dataset 
was constructed by Lynn & Vanhanen (2002), although the revised version we use is from Lynn 
& Vanhanen (2012). This dataset provides national IQ scores for a sample of 196 nations. 
Although the role of national IQ in empirical literature has been criticized (e.g. Barnett & 
Williams, 2004; Hunt & Sternberg, 2006), there is ample cross-country evidence that average IQ 
does promote growth (Weede & Kampf, 2002), reduces income inequality, and unravels why 
some nations are rich and some poor (Miller, 2002).   
We also include four control variables in our regression model: initial income (logGDP 
per PERSON), the investment rate (INVESTMENT), annual population growth rates 
(POP_GROWTH) for the period and average years of schooling of the population 
(SCHOOLING). Initial income is logged GDP per capita at the beginning of the period. The 
investment rate is proxied by gross capital formation as a share of GDP over the period. With the 
exception of human capital data, our control variables are derived from the World Bank3. 
Selecting all of the nations for which data were available, the sample consists of more 
than 90 countries over a 33-year period. We report robust standard errors to correct for the 
potential heteroskedasticity that may arise in cross-country regressions. To control for the effect 
of democracy on economic growth under different levels of intelligence, we interact 
DEMOCRACYi and IQi. This approach allows us to compare the effect of intelligence on 
economic growth in strong and weak democracies. The correlation matrix for the main variables 
is presented in Table 2. Throughout this article, we use STATA 13 for our estimations 
The regression model where the ith country’s average GDP growth rate between 1970 
and 2013 is regressed on democracy (DEMOCRACYi), intelligence (IQi), the interaction between 
intelligence and democracy, and a set of control variables is: 
iiiiii XDEMOCRACYIQIQDEMOCRACYgrowth   *7013 3210          (1)  
[Table 1 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
3. Main results 
The main regression results are reported in Table 3. In model 1, democratic index has 
anticipated sign, although bounded below zero at traditional levels of statistical significance. In 
line with predominant view, we find that ‘democracies are associated with no statistically 
                                                             
3 The data is available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all 
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signiﬁcant differences in economic growth’ (Rodrick & Wacziarg, 2005 p. 50). The coefficient 
for intelligence is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The model predicts when 
intelligence increases by one standard deviation the long run economic growth increases by 1.17 
percentage points. In model 2, we test whether the link between democracy and economic 
growth varies with a nation’s level of cognitive abilities. As conjectured above we do so by 
adding an interaction effect into the model. Notice, that after accounting for non-linear effect of 
democracy, DEMOCRACYi is now positive and statistically significant. Further, we document 
that interaction between DEMOCRACYi and IQi is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, indicating that weak democratic institutions are harmful for economic development only in 
countries with low level of cognitive abilities. In particular, for nations with high levels of IQ 
(higher than the threshold 1.0717/0.0123 = 87.13) the negative effect of weak democratic regime 
does not apply.  
Related literature reports that economic growth may lead to greater accumulation of 
human skills (Mankiw, 1997). Furthermore, intelligence may be correlated with other potential 
sources of economic growth that are not included in the econometric specification. If for 
instance, human capital (intelligence) is accumulated together with implementation of anti-
corruption or other growth-enhancing policies, this leads to omitted variable bias. To address this 
issue we regress national IQ scores on a vector of instruments (per capita energy consumption, 
per capital protein consumption from FAO and continental dummies from La Porta et al. (1999)) 
and use predicted values of intelligence in our regression (see e.g. Salahodjaev, 2015). Model 3 
shows that interaction term retains its sign and significance even when the potential endegeneity 
is controlled for. Furthermore, the estimates are similar in magnitude, compared to the results in 
Model 2.  
[Table 3 about here] 
 
One the other hand, one may argue that superior growth performance in democratic 
countries may be driven by omitted factor that is correlated with the quality of democratic 
institutions. For example, there is evidence that political participation and political constraints 
are negatively correlated with government size (Persson, 2002; Plumper & Martin, 2003) and 
this may bias our empirical results. In addition, empirical literature reports strong and positive 
association between trade openness and democracy (e.g. Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1998). 
Therefore, we test sensitivity of our results by controlling for the government size (GSi), 
measured by gross government final consumption relative to GDP, and bilateral trade (Ti) as a 
share of GDP (in model 1 in Table 4). The data is from World Bank. 
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The regression results show that while trade openness has positive effect on economic 
growth, the estimates for democracy index and interaction effect remain qualitatively and 
quantitatively unaffected.   
Another concern is that the democracy-intelligence interaction might be solely driven by 
influential observations and does not apply to mean data. In model 2, we rely on robust 
regression (RREG) developed by Hamilton (1991). RREG first performs a preliminary analysis 
based on Cook’s distance > 1 to remove gross outliers prior to estimating starting values and 
then performs Huber iterations followed by biweight iterations, as suggested by Li (1985)4. The 
estimates retain their signs and are statistically significant at the 5% level, although the value of 
the coefficient for democracy is somewhat reduced. The signs of control variables are also 
robust.  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
We next test whether the link between democracy, intelligence and interaction effect 
changes across time. In Table 5 we re-estimate Eq. (1) but for the short-run. As can be seen, 
these variables have stable estimates and are very similar to the ones for the period 1970-2013. 
In particular, the interaction effect is negative and statistically significant. Initial GDP per capita 
is negatively linked to economic growth. Investment rate is significant only when using robust 
regression. Average years of schooling and population growth rates are positive and significant 
(Barlow, 1998; Darrat & Al-Yousif, 1999). Moreover, comparing the values of the interaction 
terms in the short-run and long run regressions, we find that cognitive abilities boost economic 
growth in weak democracies more in the short-run.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
4. Robustness tests 
We have tested robustness of our findings in a number of ways. First, the highest IQ 
scores are recorded in East Asian countries (e.g. Lynn & Meisenberg, 2010). Second, Eastern 
European and Central Asian countries have suffered from substantial economic decline and have 
undergone democratization process in 1990’s. We therefore included dummy variables for these 
countries because their extant political regimes and cultural heritage could affect our estimates. 
                                                             
4rreg is implemented as an ado-file in STATA 
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The results presented in Table 6 suggest that controlling for East Asian and post-soviet nations 
do not affect main results.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
Geography is believed to be linked with long run economic growth. Latitude, for 
example, has indirect effect on long run economic development through its impact on institutions 
(Masters & McMillan, 2001; Easterly & Levine, 2003). Access to coast, on the other hand, has 
been documented to have positive effect on economic development (Faye, McArthur, Sachs & 
Snow, 2004). To control for these geographical differences, we include latitude and binary 
variable for landlocked countries in our regression. The regression results presented in Table 7 
indicate that latitude has inverted U-shaped effect on long run economic growth (significant at 
the 10% level). Notice, that controlling for the effect of geography on economic growth does not 
affect the inferences with respect to the democracy and intelligence. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Finally, we tested whether the positive effect of democracy on economic growth in 
high-IQ nations differ in sub-samples. We have therefore divided the data into two groups: high-
IQ countries and low-IQ countries. Indeed, while the coefficient for DEMOCRACY is not 
significant in low-IQ nations, the results in Model 2 suggest that democracy has significant 
positive effect in high-IQ nations.  
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
Empirical studies have long conjectured that intelligence and institutional arrangements 
such as democracy are potential determinants of economic growth. Our theoretical predictions, 
supported by econometric results, lead to a substantial reconceptualization of heterogeneous 
association between political regimes, intelligence and economic development. Most cross-
country literature on the impact of democracy on economic growth has yielded contradictory 
results. Most studies of intelligence investigate its overall effect on growth and report a positive 
effect. We believe that the relationship between these antecedents of economic development is 
more complex. Particularly, we argue that the effect of democratization is mediated by the 
degree of the approval to such policies, and that intelligence may alleviate or weaken the 
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negative effect of weak democratic institutions on economic growth. Specifically, it is the social 
capital, civic culture and political behavior that is linked to intelligence seems to alleviate the 
insignificant effect of democracy on economic growth. For example, many non-democratic 
countries, those have high levels of cognitive abilities, maintained superior growth rates over the 
past decades (China, Singapore and Republic of Korea).   
Our econometric findings show that the link between democracy and economic growth 
varies with a nation’s level of cognitive abilities. In particular, the interaction between 
democracy index and national IQ is negative indicating that weak democratic institutions are 
harmful for economic development only in countries with low level of social capital and short-
term horizon of economic agents, measured by intelligence. Another casual feedback may be that 
intelligent economic agents put in place mechanisms that restrict rent-seeking behavior and 
market failures.  
Finally, our estimates produce novel evidence into the link between political regimes and 
economic growth. In addition to documenting a positive effect of democracy, we find that 
intelligence has robust benefit to economic development – mitigating the negative effect of weak 
political institutions. Considering that rampant levels of corruption and weak rule of law has 
growth-impairing effect on financial development, innovative activity and macroeconomic 
stability in developing countries, investing in cognitive skills within them may not only increase 
the stock of human capital, but also promote market-oriented policies. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
GROWTH7013 Average annual GDP growth rates, 1970-2013 3.8119 2.1971 
DEMOCRACY Democracy index 3.6732 2.0136 
IQ National IQ 84.1026 10.8476 
LogGDP per 
PERSON 
Logged initial GDP per capita  7.7171 1.5534 
INVESTMENT Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 22.9574 8.3431 
SCHOOLING Average years of schooling at all levels 4.3087 2.6328 
POP_GROWTH Population growth (annual %) 1.7552 1.2228 
TRADE Trade (% of GDP) 83.5279 43.9915 
GS 
General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
17.4101 8.9821 
 
Table 2 
Correlation matrix 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
GROWTH7013 1.000        
logGDP per PERSON -0.356 1.000       
INVESTMENT 0.363 0.237 1.000      
POP_GROWTH 0.284 -0.643 -0.312 1.000     
SCHOOLING -0.153 0.742 0.280 -0.678 1.000    
TRADE 0.243 0.132 0.306 -0.038 0.179 1.000   
GS -0.123 0.403 0.264 -0.270 0.345 0.199 1.000  
DEMOCRACY -0.230 0.633 0.123 -0.588 0.630 0.101 0.177 1.000 
IQ 0.124 0.694 0.434 -0.704 0.696 0.109 0.199 0.532 
 
Table 3 
Intelligence, democracy and economic growth: long run effect 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
IV 
(4)  
OLS  
Standardized 
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betas 
LogGDP per PERSON -0.7456*** -0.6381*** -0.721*** -0.605*** 
 (0.1197) (0.1239) (0.1482)  
INVESTMENT 0.1049*** 0.0987*** 0.1410*** 0.317*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0356) (0.0341)  
POP_GROWTH 0.9915*** 0.9794*** 0.8183*** 0.568*** 
 (0.1844) (0.1789) (0.1979)  
SCHOOLING 0.0610 0.0699 0.1338** 0.116 
 (0.0509) (0.0496) (0.0527  
DEMOCRACY 0.0256 1.0717*** 0.9631*** 1.416*** 
 (0.0743) (0.3634) (0.4828)  
IQ 0.1075*** 0.1440*** 0.1206*** 1.051*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0238) (0.0277)  
DEMOCRACY*IQ  -0.0123*** -0.0106*** -1.631*** 
  (0.0042) (0.0057)  
Constant  -3.9928*** -7.6408*** -6.0836*** - 
 (1.4173) (2.0295) (2.4287)  
N 93 93 91 93 
adj. R2 0.5842 0.6352 0.5791 0.6352 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth in real GDP, 1970-2013. Heteroskedasticity 
adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level is denoted by ***; ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level; and * significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 4 
Intelligence, democracy and economic growth: sensitivity test 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
RREG 
(3) 
OLS 
Standardized 
betas 
LogGDP per PERSON -0.6794*** -0.7397*** -0.6441*** 
 (0.1316) (0.1071)  
INVESTMENT 0.0770** 0.0949*** 0.2476** 
 (0.0365) (0.0208)  
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POP_GROWTH 0.9306*** 0.6570*** 0.5399*** 
 (0.1957) (0.1498)  
SCHOOLING 0.0408 0.0732 0.0675 
 (0.0498) (0.0575)  
DEMOCRACY 1.0951*** 0.9234** 1.4470*** 
 (0.4007) (0.3854)  
IQ 0.0499* 0.0404 1.1007 
 (0.0268) (0.0256)  
DEMOCRACY*IQ -0.0126*** -0.0103** -1.6999** 
 (0.0045) (0.0045)  
TRADE 0.0053** 0.0057*** 0.1571** 
 (0.0027) (0.0020)  
GS 0.0202 -0.0031 0.0638 
 (0.0313) (0.0206)  
Constant  -7.9329*** -4.9469*** - 
 (2.3660) (1.8162)  
N 93 93 93 
adj. R2 0.6610 0.6770 0.6610 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth in real GDP, 1970-2013. Heteroskedasticity 
adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level is denoted by ***; ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level; and * significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 5 
Intelligence, democracy and interaction effect: short run effect 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
RREG 
(3) 
OLS Standardized 
betas 
LogGDP per PERSON -0.7028*** -0.7423*** -0.6571*** 
 (0.1505) (0.1328)  
INVESTMENT 0.0536 0.0832*** 0.1522 
 (0.0333) (0.0241)  
POP_GROWTH 0.8264*** 0.7658*** 0.5224*** 
 (0.1477) (0.1299)  
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SCHOOLING 0.1187* 0.1498** 0.1770* 
 (0.0601) (0.0694)  
DEMOCRACY 1.5665*** 1.3129*** 1.8052*** 
 (0.5790) (0.4851)  
IQ 0.1682*** 0.1385*** 1.0408*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0270)  
DEMOCRACY*IQ -0.0192*** -0.0155*** -2.2493*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0056)  
TRADE 0.0029 0.0022 0.0777 
 (0.0021) (0.0025)  
GS -0.0024 -0.0232 -0.0071 
 (0.0266) (0.0238)  
Constant -7.9629** -5.8251*** - 
 (3.1203) (2.1878)  
N 120 120 120 
adj. R2 0.5884 0.5666 0.5884 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth in real GDP, 1990-2013. Heteroskedasticity 
adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level is denoted by ***; ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level; and * significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 6 
Intelligence, democracy and economic growth: East Asia and post-soviet nations 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
LogGDP per PERSON -0.7096*** -0.7660*** 
 (0.1450) (0.1507) 
INVESTMENT 0.0818** 0.0607* 
 (0.0381) (0.0324) 
POP_GROWTH 0.9423*** 0.7757*** 
 (0.1980) (0.1579) 
SCHOOLING 0.0569 0.1515** 
 (0.0506) (0.0587) 
DEMOCRACY 1.0604*** 1.6422*** 
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 (0.3926) (0.5751) 
TRADE 0.0055** 0.0035 
 (0.0027) (0.0022) 
GS 0.0174 -0.0114 
 (0.0315) (0.0260) 
IQ 0.1520*** 0.1897*** 
 (0.0276) (0.0390) 
DEMOCRACY*IQ -0.0123*** -0.0207*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0069) 
East Asia & Pacific -0.2156 -0.7852** 
 (0.3295) (0.3206) 
Europe & Central Asia 0.7202*** -0.7842 
 (0.2065) (0.6278) 
Constant -7.9183*** -9.0512*** 
 (2.4161) (3.1828) 
N 93 120 
adj. R2 0.6187 0.5659 
Period 1970-2013 1990-2013 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth in real GDP. Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level is denoted by ***; ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level; and * significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 7 
Democracy, intelligence and economic growth: the role of geography  
 (1) 
OLS 
LogGDP per PERSON -0.6564*** 
 (0.1306) 
INVESTMENT 0.0977*** 
 (0.0349) 
POP_GROWTH 1.0553*** 
 (0.1948) 
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SCHOOLING 0.0845 
 (0.0536) 
DEMOCRACY 1.4644*** 
 (0.4784) 
IQ 0.1536*** 
 (0.0258) 
DEMOCRACY*IQ -0.0171*** 
 (0.0056) 
=1 if landlocked 0.1647 
 (0.3638) 
LATITUDE  0.0831* 
 (0.0465) 
LATITUDE SQUARED -0.0003* 
 (0.0002) 
Constant -2.5639 
 (3.3314) 
N 93 
adj. R2 0.6059 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth in real GDP, 1970-2013. Heteroskedasticity 
adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level is denoted by ***; ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level; and * significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 8  
Intelligence, democracy and economic growth: the sub-samples 
 (1) 
RREG 
(2) 
RREG 
LogGDP per PERSON -0.589*** -1.117*** 
 (0.186) (0.139) 
INVESTMENT 0.086*** 0.032 
 (0.029) (0.036) 
POP_GROWTH 0.661*** 1.463*** 
 (0.179) (0.152) 
SCHOOLING 0.131 0.028 
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 (0.106) (0.070) 
DEMOCRACY 0.034 0.192* 
 (0.103) (0.105) 
IQ 0.069*** 0.103*** 
 (0.026) (0.034) 
Constant -1.223 0.238 
 (1.813) (2.503) 
N 73 45 
adj. R2 0.252 0.865 
Threshold IQ<88 IQ>88 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth in real GDP, 1990-2013. Heteroskedasticity 
adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level is denoted by ***; ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level; and * significance at the 10% level. 
